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INTRODUCTION
In February 1996, the New York State Department of
Transportation fired Joseph Kilcullen from his position as a snowplow
driver in the Department's Highway Maintenance training program.1
Alleging that the state discharged him because of his epilepsy and
learning disability,2 Kilcullen sued his former employer under the
Americans with Disabilities Act {"ADA"),3 which abrogated states'
sovereign immunity and permitted private suits for damages against
states in federal court.4 Kilcullen asserted only that he was not treated
I. Kilcullen v. New York State Dep't of Transp., 33 F. Supp. 2d 133, l36 (N.D.N.Y.

1 999).
2. Id.
3. 42 u.s.c. §§ 1 2 1 0 1 -1 22 1 3 ( 1 994).
4. Kilc11llen, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1 37 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12202 ( 1 994)). Subsequent to
Kilcullen, the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the ADA permitting suits
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the same as similarly situated non-disabled employees; his claim did
not implicate the ADA's requirement that employers provide "rea
sonable accommodation" to disabled · employees.5 Nevertheless, the
federal district court for the Northern District of New York concluded
that to determine the validity of the ADA's abrogation of state sover
eign immunity in Kilcullen's case, it had to consider whether the ADA
as a whole - including the reasonable accommodation provisions was a valid exercise of Congress's power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.6
By discussing the propriety of a facial analysis of the ADA's abro
gation of sovereign immunity, the district court in Kilcullen v. New
York State Department of Transportation7 addressed an important
procedural issue that the Supreme Court has failed to acknowledge in
any of its section 5 cases since City of Boerne v. Flores.8 The Court's
silence on this point does not indicate inaction; in its recent cases, the
Court has tacitly applied a new approach to adjudicating challenges to
legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's power under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. This new approach not only permits fa
cial challenges where previously they have been disfavored, but also
assesses those challenges under a test that replaces the traditional
standard with a version of overbreadth analysis typically reserved to
the First Amendment context.9
against state employers as exceeding Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Bd. ofTrs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
5. Kilc11/len, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
6. See id. Under Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 ( 1 9%), Congress may abrogate
states' immunity from suit for damages in federal court only when acting pursuant to section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5. Such an abrogation is appropriate enforcement legislation only if it provides a congruent
and proportional remedy to state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Garrett, 531 U.S.
at 365; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81-82 (2000) ; Florida Prepaid Post
secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637-39 (1999); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-20 (1997). In Kilcullen, for example, the state argued that the
ADA did not validly abrogate its sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs' claims were
therefore barred. 33 F. Supp. 2d at 136. In analyzing this claim, the court considered whether
the ADA was "a congruent and proportional response" to violations of the Equal Protection
Clause, or, instead, whether it exceeded Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 1 39-40. The Kilcullen court acknowledged that the facts of the case be
fore it did not involve the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirements. Id. at 144. The
court found, however, that the ADA's anti-discrimination provisions and the reasonable ac
commodation requirement were both incorporated into the statutory definitions of "quali
fied individual with a disability" and "discriminate." Id. Accordingly, "the aspect on which
[the plaintiff rested] his claim ha[d] no separate textual manifestation from the accommoda
tion requirement." Id. The constitutional validity of the antidiscrimination provision therefore depended on the validity of the reasonable accommodation requirement. Id.
·

7. 33 F. Supp. 2d 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
8. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
9. Arguably, this new approach characterizes the Court's recent decisions analyzing
legislation under the Commerce Clause as well. See, e.g. , United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S
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Traditionally, constitutionar adjudication in the federal courts pro
ceeds through "as-applied" challenges, in which litigants challenge a
statute as it applies to their own conduct in their particular cases.10 In
general, "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will
not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might
also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional."11 The primacy of as-applied
challenges reflects the principle that the judicial power to invalidate
legislative acts is properly exercised only in concrete cases and contro
versies.12
Occasionally, "weighty countervailing policies" have persuaded
the Court to entertain "facial" challenges, in which a party raises con
stitutional objections to the terms of the statute itself - without
regard to the precise circumstances of his particular case - even if the
statute validly would apply to the particular party in the absence of
the challenged provisions.13 The prototypical example is a First
598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 5 14 U.S. 549 (1995). This Note focuses only on federal
legislation passed pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
JO. See generally HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 195-213 (Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al. eds., 4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART
& WECHSLER]; Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional
Adj1.ulication: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 137 1 , 1 386-87 (2000 );
Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236
(1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1 321, 1321 (2000); Marc E. l sserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial
Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 360 (1998); Henry P.
Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 277 (1984).
11. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-26 ( 1960) (declining to consider whether the
potential applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1 957 to private actors violated the state ac
tion requirement of the Fifteenth Amendment where the actual defe ndants were state offi
cials); accord Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20
'
(1912) ("(T]his court must deal with the case in hand and not with imaginary ones.").
12. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 , 61 1 (1 973) ("Constitutional judgments, as
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall recognized, are justified only out of the necessity of adjudicating
rights in particular cases between the litigants brought before the Court . . . . " (citing
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137, 1 78 (1803))); see also New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 767-68 ( 1 982); Raines, 362 U.S. at 20-22; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1 0, at
1 97: Fallon, supra note 10, at 1330: lsserles, supra note 10, at 361, 366, 454-55. For a discus
sion of how the Court's approach to adjudicating section 5 cases conflicts with the proper
scope of judicial review, see infra Section I I .A.
13. Raines, 362 U.S. at 22. Some commentators have argued that djstinguishing between
as-applied and facial challenges creates a false dichotomy between these modes of adjudica
tion. Professor Fallon has argued, for example, that there are no distinct categories of facial
or as-applied challenges. Fallon, supra note 10. at 1 336-38. Rather, in Fallon's view. every
litigant must assert that a statute is invalid in his case. and a determination that a statute is
facially or partly invalid is simply a consequence of the relevant constitutional test. Id. In
response, Professor Adler contends that all challenges are facial challenges because all con
stitutional rights are rights against rules, and the role of a court is to measure a rule of law on its face - against the appropriate constitutional test. Adler, supra note IO, at 1386-88.
Taking a different tack, lsserles asserts that the traditional distinction between facial and
as-applied challenges actually masks variations within the category of facial challenges.
Isserles, supra note 10, at 363-64. Facial challenges, according to lsserles, may be either
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Amendment overbreadth challenge, in which a party to whom a stat
ute constitutionally applies may nevertheless challenge the statute on
the ground that in other circumstances it may reach a substantial
amount of protected First Amendment expression.14 Outside the First
Amendment context, however, the Court has generally disfavored fa
cial challenges,15 holding that such challenges may succeed only when
"no set of circumstances exists under which the [aJct would be valid."16
"overbreadth" challenges, which predicate facial invalidity on some aggregate number of
unconstitutional applications of an otherwise valid rule, or "valid rule" challenges, which
argue that a constitutional defe ct inheres in the terms of the statute itself, independent of
any particular application. Id. This Note does not attempt to engage these disputes over the
correctness of the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, insofar as courts con
tinue in practice to operate on the basis of this distinction. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535
U.S. 564 (2002); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 1 73 ( 1991); FW/PBS, Inc.
v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Nevertheless, the Court's new approach to adjudicating the validity of legislation under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as described in this Note, raises a number of inter
esting implications for this debate.
14. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769-70; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-15; see also Dorf, supra
note 10, at 261-78. Third-party standing also constitutes an exception to the as-applied
regime in situations where the Court's prudential rules render such standing appropriate. See
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 187-95; Monaghan, supra note 10, at 278. For discus
sions of the role that overbreadth analysis and third-party standing, as well as the rules of
statutory severability, play in resolving conflicts between the as-applied regime and the rule
that every person has a right to be judged by a valid rule of law - what Professor Monaghan
has called the "valid rule requirement," - see Dorf, supra note 10, at 242-49; Fallon, supra
note 10, at 133 1 ; l sserles, supra note LO, at 368-71 , 388-91; and Monaghan, supra note 10, at
282.
15. See FWIPBS, 493 U.S. at 223; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 ("[W]e have not recognized
an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."). Even in
the First Amendment context, the Court has proceeded with caution in permitting parties to
raise overbreadth challenges. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769-70; Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
760 (1 974) (noting that even in the First Amendment context, the Court has "repeatedly
expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its face where there were a substantial
number of situations to which it might be validly applied"); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613
(noting that overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine" that the Court applies "sparingly and
only as a last resort"). Professor Dorf has argued that although the Court has purported to
disfavor facial challenges, it has in fact adopted this approach in numerous areas. See Dorf,
supra note 10, at 236, 251-81 . Dorf and others point to rules against underinclusive or dis
criminatory statutes and rules against suspect classifications or impermissible purpose as
examples of constitutional standards that measure a statute on its face. See id.; see alvo
lsserles, supra note 10, al 440-46. As Professor Fallon has suggested, see Fallon, supra note
10, at 1336, and as this Note will elaborate, the Court's new test for appropriate section 5
legislation constitutes yet another departure from the general rule that overbreadth chal
lenges are not permissible outside the First Amendment context. See infra Section I.A.
16. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745; see also Adler, supra note LO, at 1 389 n.62 (citing cases
reaffirming the Salerno standard). The Salemo standard for fa cial challenges outside the
First Amendment overbreadth context has drawn much criticism, both for its severity and
for its accuracy as a statement of the standard governing facial challenges. See, e.g., Morales,
527 U.S. at 55 n.22 (opinion of Stevens, J.); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740
(1997) (Stevens, J., concurring); Adler, supra note 10, at 1 389-90 (noting that the Court has
sustained facial challenges even when there seemed to be some constitutional applications
and the First Amendment was not implicated); Dorf, supra note 10, at 236 (arguing that
Salemo does not accurately characterize the standard for facial challenges in many cases);
Isserles, supra note 10, at 372-75, 456-63 (summarizing common criticisms of Salerno's
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In City of Boerne v. Flores,11 the Supreme Court adopted a new
test for the validity of federal legislation enacted under Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.18 Recognizing that
Congress's enforcement power is limited to remedying or preventing
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has required
that legislation enacted pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment exhibit a "congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end."19
Apart from this heightened scrutiny of ends and means, the
Court's recent section 5 cases have entailed another important innova
tion. The Court in these cases has departed from the traditional
"as-applied" method of adjudication in favor of a facial overbreadth
approach. Instead of considering legislation in light of the particular
facts and claims of a given case, the Court has examined the chal
lenged statutes on their faces. Instead of asking whether any set of cir
cumstances exists in which the challenged statutes might appropriately
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against unconstitutional state ac
tion, the Court has asked whether many of the state acts affected by
these statutes have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Court has adopted this approach without any discus
sion of its merits or drawbacks.20 The issue has also largely escaped
academic discussion.21
severity and noting that many of the Court's cases considering regulations of abortion depart
from the Salerno standard); Rachel D. King, Comment, A Back Door Solution: Stenberg v.
Carhart and the Answer to the Casey/Salerno Dilemma for Facial Challenges to A bortion
Staflltes, 50 EMORY L.J. 873 (2001) (arguing that Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), replaced Salerno as the standard for evaluating facial challenges in cases involving
regulations of abortion). Justice Scalia, noting the inherent tension between facial invalida
tion and the proper scope of judicial review, has defended Salerno as the proper standard for
evaluating a facial challenge and has demonstrated that federal courts generally continue to
apply Salerno in facial-challenge cases. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 77-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
lsserles has also defended S11/er110, arguing that the common critique of Salemo is based on
the incorrect assumption that Salemo is the standard for "overbreadth" facial challenges. See
Isserles, supra note JO, at 375-82. According to l sserles, Salerno accurately describes a "valid
rule" facial challenge, in which a constitutional defect inheres in the terms of a statute itself,
such that the statute in fact has no valid applications. See id. Regardless of whether the
language of Salerno is taken literally or understood as lsserles has interpreted it, this Note
will argue that the Court's recent section 5 cases have invalidated statutes on their face even
where the Salerno standard was not met. See infra Section I.A.
1 7. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
1 8 . Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
19. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
20. Justice Stevens made the only comments on this issue in any section 5 case since City
of Boerne. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 653-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that be-
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Despite the Court's failure to acknowledge or defend this new ap
proach, the choice between facial overbreadth and as-applied analysis
- like any procedural decision22 - promises to be of great importance
in future section 5 cases. In particular, the success of any challenge to
the validity of the abrogation of immunity in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 may likely depend on the method of adjudication.23
cause the plaintiffs alleged a willful - not negligent - patent infringement, the Court
should consider only whether the Patent Remedy Act validly abrogated state sovereign
immunity in cases of willful - not negligent - patent infringement, and complaining that
"the Court's . . . negative answer to that question has nothing to do with the facts of this
case").
21. Although the Court's recent section 5 cases have generated a great deal of scholarly
commentary, most of this commentary, like the Court's opinions, has ignored the application
of a facial analysis. But see Fallon, supra note 10, at 1336, 1356-58 (discussing Florida
Prepaid as a possible departure from the traditional rules of facial versus as-applied adjudi
cation).
22. Professor Dorf points out, for example, that disagreements on the outcomes of many
abortion cases have often boiled down to disagreements over whether the Salerno standard
should apply. See Dorf, supra note 10, at 236-37 (citing Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992)). More broadly, the method of adjudication or theory
of jurisprudence a judge brings to a case can dramatically influence how a judge evaluates a
law or resolves a legal dispute. A canonical example is the contrasting opinions of Justices
Chase and Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), where the Justices considered
the circumstances under which a court ought to invalidate an act of the legislature. Justice
Chase espoused a natural-law theory and concluded that a legislative act "contrary to the
great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legisla
tive authority," id. at 388, while Justice Iredell adopted a more positivist methodology and
asserted that a court cannot determine the validity of a legislative act by referring to "princi
ples of natural justice." Id. at 399. For both Justices, the substantive outcome - judicial
invalidation of a legislative act - was determined in part by the prior methodological choice
of whether to take principles of natural law into account. See also PHILIP BOBBIIT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (examining alternative
methods of constitutional argument and adjudication); HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW 694-95 (William Eskridge & Philip Frickey eds., 1994) (arguing that the wisdom of sub
stantive decisions depends on the soundness of the chosen procedure).
23. Title V I I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000), prohibits
discrimination by employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. In
1972, Title V I I was amended to include "governments," "governmental agencies," and
"political subdivisions" within the definition of employers covered by the Act. Equal
Opportunity Employment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2 (1), 86 Stat. 103. The Supreme
Court held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer that these amendments abrogated state sovereign immu
nity. 427 U.S. 445, 449 n.2, 452-53 (1976). The parties in Fitzpatrick did not dispute that the
1972 amendments were a valid exercise of Congress's power under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, so the issue technically remains an open question. See id. at 456
n.11. In the wake of City of Boerne and subsequent section 5 cases, new challenges to the
validity of the abrogation of sovereign immunity in Title VII have begun to make their way
through the lower courts. Some courts have rested on Fitzpatrick and upheld the abrogation,
reasoning that even if subsequent cases have undermined Fitzpatrick, the case · remains
binding on the lower courts until the Supreme Court overrules it. See, e.g., Holman v.
Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402 n.2 (7th Cir. 2000); Nanda v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of lll., 219 F.
Supp. 2d 911, 913-14 (N.D. lll. 2001); Okokuro v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Welfare, No. 002044, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15699, at *9-11 ( E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2000). Other courts have
acknowledged Fitzpatrick but have proceeded to analyze the Title VII question anew under
the Court's more recent section 5 decisions. See, e.g., Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d
615, 624-27 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding the disparate treatment and disparate impact provi-
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To constitute a valid exercise of Congress's power under section 5, the
abrogation of immunity in Title VII must provide a congruent and
proportional remedy to state violations of the Equal Protection
Clause.24 Title VII's prohibition of intentional racial discrimination by
state employers closely mirrors that clause.25 The abrogation of
sovereign immunity for intentional discrimination - in isolation from
other provisions of the Act - certainly passes the standards of City of
Boerne and its progeny.26 Under the new section 5 overbreadth ap
proach, however, any state defe ndant in a Title VII suit could argue
that the validity of this abrogation depends on the validity of Title
VII's disparate impact provisions,27 even in suits alleging only inten
tional discrimination. As the Fourteenth Amendment itself does not
prohibit state action that produces an unintentional discriminatory
effect, these provisions are much less likely to satisfy the Court's test
for appropriate section 5 legislation.28 Thus, if the Court chooses to
sions of Title VII as valid section 5 legislation); In re Employment Discrimination Litig .
Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1319-24 ( I Ith Cir. 1999) (holding that the disparate impact
provisions of Title VII are a valid exercise of Congress's section 5 power). For a discussion
of how the Court's new approach to adjudicating challenges under section 5 may affect the
outcome of a challenge to Title VII, see infra Part Ill.
24. See supra note 6.
25. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits all intentional
racial discrimination by states that cannot satisfy the Court's most exacting scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Ann Carey Juliano. The More You Spend, the
More You Save: Can the Spending Clause Save Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws?, 46 VILL.
L. REV. llll, 1112 (200 1); see infra note 207.
26. The City of Boerne cases presumed that legislation that "merely parrots the precise
wording of the Fourteenth Amendment" was an appropriate exercise of Congress's section 5
power; rather, the controversy in each of these cases was how far beyond that precise word
ing Congress could venture. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); see also
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) ("[Section 5] legislation
reaching beyond the scope of§ / 's actual guarantees must exhibit 'congruence and propor
tionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end.' " (quoting City of Boerne v . Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 ( 1997) (emphasis added)).
27. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court interpreted Title VJl's
anti-discrimination provisions to prohibit neutral employment practices that produced a dis
criminatory effect and were not justified by business necessity. 401 U.S. 424. 431 (1971)
("What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barri
ers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification."). See generally EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 123-91 (Samuel Estreicher & Michael C. Harper, eds., 2000). In
1991, Congress codified the relevant burdens of proof in disparate impact cases. See Civil
Rights Act of 1 991, Pub. L. No. 102-166. I05 Stat. I071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)

(2000)).

28. The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit facially neutral state action that pro
duces a disparate impact in the absence of a discriminatory purpose. See Pers. Adm'r v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 279 (1979); Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). Although
Congress may enact legislation under section 5 that prohibits state conduct that is not itself
unconstitutional, see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, the Court has been particularly reluctant to
approve statutes that impose a heightened burden of scrutiny upon state action that warrants
only rational basis review under the Fourteenth Amendment itself. See id. at 372 (noting that
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entertain a facial challenge to-Title VII's abrogation, the Act's abroga
tion of immunity in suits alleging intentional discrimination may
be struck down, even though on its own it easily qualifies as an
appropriate means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Note argues that the Court's recent section 5 cases depart
from the traditional method of constitutional adjudication. Part I ar
gues that the Court's·decisions since City of Boerne have introduced a
form of overbreadth doctrine into the analysis of section 5 legislation
akin to the approach used in the First Amendment context. In par
ticular, the Court has both entertained facial challenges where the tra
ditional rules would not permit them and applied a new standard for
evaluating those challenges. Part II challenges the wisdom of this ap
proach, arguing that the new approach is inconsistent with settled
principles of judicial review and severability and raises some puzzling
internal inconsistencies within the section 5 doctrine. Federalism con
cerns do not appear to outweigh these difficulties. Part III argues that
this new approach has significant ramifications for the substantive
outcomes of future civil rights cases, as demonstrated in the context of
Title VII. The Note concludes that in light of the many troubling
aspects of this method of adjudication, and given the dispositive effect
the methodological choice can exert on substantive outcomes, the
Court should consider the appropriateness of this approach more ex
plicitly before permitting it to continue.

the ADA imposes significantly greater obligations on state employers than the Equal Pro
tection Clause imposes, and that the Act requires the state to justify its own practices rather
than requiring a challenger to prove the irrationality of those practices); see also Kimel. 528
U.S. at 86-88 (noting that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act effectively imposed
heightened scrutiny on state employment practices even though the Equal Protection Clause
only required the practices to have a rational basis). Two courts of appeals have upheld the
disparate impact provisions of Title VII on the theory that disparate impact is a tool for
proving intentional discrimination and is therefore a congruent and proportional prophylac
tic measure designed to prevent unconstitutional purposeful discrimination. See Okruhlik,
255 F.3d at 626-27 (noting that unintentional disparate impact may be "functionally equiva
lent" to intentional discrimination and that the "prophylactic" response in Title VII is there
fore congruent and proportional); In re Employment Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d at 132 1 22 (noting that a "genuine finding of disparate impact can be highly probative o f the em
ployer's motive," such that "the disparate impact provisions of Title VII can reasonably be
characterized as 'preventive rules' " that target the same core injury as the Equal Protection
Clause). The Supreme Court has hinted, however, that it might find this argument unpersua
sive. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-73 ("Although disparate impact may be relevant evidence
of racial discrimination, such evidence alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth
Amendment subjects state action to strict scrutiny."). The validity of the disparate impact
provisions ultimately may depend on the Court's evaluation of the evidence before Congress
that a broad prophylactic approach was a necessary response to a history or pattern of state
employment discrimination. Cf Okruhlik, 255 F.3d at 624-25 (finding sufficient legislative
findings); In re Employment Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d at 1 323 (same).
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SECTION FIVE 0VERBREADTH EXPOSED

Since 1997, the Court has decided six cases dealing with Congress's
power to enact legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.29 Although none of those cases involved claims under
the First Amendment, and although the Court has purported to
disfavor facial challenges outside that context, the Court has disposed
of each of the cases using a facial analysis. Section I.A argues that the
Court has replaced the standard of United States v. Salerno/'0 the
general standard governing facial challenges, with an approach that is
more akin to the standard of Broadrick v. Oklahama,31 which governs
First Amendment overbreadth claims. Section I.B. contends that this
section 5 overbreadth approach departs from both the traditional rules
of constitutional adjudication and the analysis applied in previous sec
tion 5 cases.
A. Adoption of the O verbreadth Approach in the City of Boerne
Cases
Under the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face if it burdens a substantial
amount of protected expression.32 In this context, a facial challenge
proceeds by comparing the challenged statute as a whole against the
relevant constitutional standard.33 Success of such a challenge does not
depend on the validity of the particular application before the court,
nor does the scope of the analysis depend on the circumstances of the
litigant's particular case.34 Instead, the appropriateness of facial invali
dation depends upon the existence of a substantial number of
illegitimate potential applications relative to the "plainly legitimate
sweep" of the statute.35 Although these principles are nominally con-

29. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000 ); Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 ( 1 999); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1 997). For ease of reference, this Note refers to these cases
collectively as the "City of Boerne cases."
30. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
3 1 . 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
32. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (citing Broadrick, 413
U.S. at 612).
33. See, e.g., id. at 246-49 (conducting a facial analysis by comparing the terms of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act with the definition of proscribable obscenity set out in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 ( 1 973)).
34. See, e.g., id.
35. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
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fined to the First Amendment context,36 the Court's recent cases
addressing the validity of federal legislation under Congress's power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment embody the First Amendment
overbreadth approach.
Like the approach in First Amendment cases, the approach in the
Court's recent section 5 decisions measures the valldity of a chal
lenged statute on its face. The now-familiar "congruence and propor
tionality" test for appropriate section 5 legislation established by the
City of Boerne cases requires comparison of tbe challenged statute both its text and supporting findings - to the substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.37 In part, this requirement reflects the
remedial nature of Congress's section 5 power: As "[l]egislation which
alters the meaning of the [Fourteenth Amendment] cannot be said to
be enforcing the [Fourteenth Amendment],"38 the Court must ensure
that the challenged statute conforms to judicial interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Since City of Boerne, the Court has conducted this comparison
solely by reference to the terms of the challenged statutes or the leg
islative findings supporting the statute. In general, the Court has ig
nored the facts of the particular cases, assessed the challenged legisla
tion without regard to its appropriateness as applied to the state action
in question, and announced holdings that exceeded the scope of the
plaintiffs' original claims. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,39 for
example, the Court considered the validity of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA'') under section 5.40 Three groups of
plaintiffs alleged that their state employer had violated the ADEA by
discriminating because of age, by failing to promote older employees,
by retaliating against employees who filed complaints with the EEOC,
and by utilizing practices with a disparate impact on older employees.41
The state argued in defense that it was immune from suit, thereby im
plicating Congress's power to abrogate that immunity under section 5
as a means of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.42 Despite the
variety of facts alleged, the Court never paused to consider whether
36. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("[W]e have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."). But see supra
notes 1 5-16.
37. As the Court first articulated in City of Boerne, legislation is "appropriate" under
section 5 if it is a congruent and proportional means to achieving the legitimate end of
remedying or preventing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 521 U.S. 507. 520
(1 997).
38. City of Boerne. 521 U.S. at 519.
39. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
40. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66-67.
4 1 . Id. at 69-70.
42. Id. at 66; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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the state employers had in fact violated the Equal Protection Clause in
any of these circumstances.43 Despite the variety of ADEA provisions
implicated, the Court glossed over any differences in the plaintiffs'
claims and the statutory provisions at issue.44 Instead, the Court's
analysis compared the obligations imposed on state employers by the
terms of the Act with those imposed by the Equal Protection Clause,
concluding that "[m]easured against the rational basis standard of our
equal protection jurisprudence, the ADEA plainly imposes substan
tially higher burdens on state employers."45
Similarly, when considering the constitutionality of the abrogation
of state immunity in the ADA as an appropriate enforcement of
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court in .Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett46 compared the ADA and its sup
porting findings against the "metes and bounds of the constitutional
right in question."47 As in Kimel, the Garrett Court did not ask
whether the state defendant had violated the Equal Protection Clause,
nor did it discuss the appropriateness of the ADA's application in the
particular circumstances before the Court:48 By focusing on the chal
lenged legislation without regard to its appropriateness in the case
before the Court, the inquiry in the recent section 5 cases has mirrored
the approach in First Amendment facial challenges.49

43. The factual circumstances were similarly irrelevant to the Court's decision in Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Boarcl v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644
n.9 ( 1999) (limiting discussion of whether a due process violation had actually occurred to
the observation that "[i]t is worth mentioning that the State of Florida provides remedies to
patent owners for alleged infringement on the part of the State"). Although the Court in
'College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board appeared
at times to be more attuned to the factual context of the case, see 527 U.S. 666, 675 ( 1 999)
(finding "no deprivation of property at issue here" (emphasis added)), the analysis did not
turn on the constitutionality of the state's actions or the appropriateness of the challenged
remedial legislation in the particular circumstances before the Court. See id. at 705 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("I do not know whether the State has engaged in false advertising or unfair
competition as College Savings Bank alleges. But this case was dismissed at the threshold.").
44. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-87. To borrow Professor Fallon's terminology, the analysis
in these cases has not distinguished among the various "subrules" contained in challenged
legislation, even though the presumption of severability would suggest that some subrules
may be applied validly even if others may not. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1334; see also
infra Section 1 1.B (discussing severability analysis).
45. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 87.
46. 53 1 U.S. 356 (2001).
47. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
48. See id. at 365-68. 372-73. Similarly, in Florida Prepaid, the Court formulated a test
that compared the text and legislative history of the Patent Remedy Act against the
Fourteenth Amendment: "[F]or Congress to invoke § 5, it must identify conduct transgress
ing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct." 527 U.S. at 639.
49. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246-49 (2002) (comparing
the terms of the Child Pornography Prevention Act with the Miller definition of obscenity
without considering the facts of the immediate case); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 41 5 U.S.
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This is not to say that any method of adjudication that looks
beyond the factual circumstances of the particular case necessarily
converts into a facial analysis. As Justice Stevens has noted, "the va
lidity of a congressional decision to abrogate sovereign immunity in a
category of cases does not depend on the strength of the claim as
serted in a particufar case within that category."50 One need not adopt
an artificially stylized view of the as-applied approach, however, to
understand the Court's recent section 5 cases as a clear shift to a facial
analysis. Total neglect of the factual context in these cases has resulted
in holdings that exceed the scope of the claims before the Court. The
Court has assessed the validity of congressional abrogation in a
category of cases by looking to the strength of potential claims that fall
outside the relevant category altogether.51
The decision in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank52 exemplifies this approach. The plain
tiffs in that case sued the state under the federal Patent Remedy Act,
alleging a willful patent infringement by the State of Florida.53 Never
theless, one of the Court's principal reasons for invalidating the abro
gation of sovereign immunity in the Act was its potential application
in cases of negligent patent infringement.54 Moreover, the legislative
130, 133 (1974) (noting that "it is immaterial" whether the litigant's conduct "might be
punishable under a properly limited statute or ordinance").
50. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
693 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. This method of measuring the validity of section 5 legislation against the relevant
constitutional standard without regard to the particular application or claim in question also
characterizes the dissents in the Court's recent cases. In both College Savings Bank and
Garrett, for example, the dissenting Justices argued that the terms and legislative histories of
the challenged statutes conformed to the relevant constitutional standards. See, e.g., Garrett,
531 U.S. at 385-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (comparing the text and legislative history of the
ADA with the relevant equal protection standards without regard to the applications before
the Court); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (judging the Lanham
Act by reference to the Due Process Clause without regard to the applications before the
Court). Although they reach contrary conclusions, these opinions mirror the majority opin
ions' inattention to the application of the statutes in the particular cases. Only Justice
Stevens' dissent in Florida Prepaid takes a different approach. Noting that the plaintiffs only
alleged a willful patent infringement, the question in that case. according to Justice Stevens.
was whether the Patent Remedy Act could be applied to a willful infringement. Florida
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 653-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' complaint that the ma
jority's "negative answer to that question has nothing to do with the facts of this case" con
stitutes the only statement in any opinion in the recent section 5 cases that acknowledges the
Court's new facial approach. Id. at 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This dissent thus represents
the only opinion in the recent section 5 cases that confines its analysis to the scope of the
claims raised.
52. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
53. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 632-33. Unlike Kimel and Garreff, which implicated
Congress's power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, Florie/a Prepaid considered
whether the Patent Remedy Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power under section 5 to
enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
54. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
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record inadequately justified the need for the Act because it focused
only on innocent or negligent infringement.ss Finding that "Congress
did nothing to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving
arguable constitutional violations," the Court struck down the Act
without pausing to consider whether the immediate case in fact in
volved an arguable constitutional violation.56 Similarly, in City of
Boerne, the Court did not discuss whether the state action at issue ac.:
tually violated the Constitution, but instead focused on the potential
for the statute's broad application in other circumstances.57 The scope
of the Court's holding thus greatly exceeded the scope of the plaintiff's
claim.
Having tacitly elected to entertain facial challenges to section 5
legislation, the Court has adopted an overbreadth approach for evalu
ating the success of those challenges. As the Court articulated in
United States v. Salerno,58 where no protected First Amendment activ
ity is burdened, a facial challenge traditionally succeeds only if the
challenger can "establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid."59 The First Amendment overbreadth
standard articulated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma� constitutes the prin
cipal exception to this rule.61 Whereas the Salerno standard requires a
challenger to show invalidity in every application, the Broadrick stan
dard requires a challenger to demonstrate invalidity in a substantial
number of applications, "judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep."62 The City of Boerne cases involved no First
Amendment challenges; as such, any facial analysis in those cases
should have been governed by the Salerno standard. Nevertheless, the
Court analyzed the facial validity of the challenged statutes in those
cases under a standard that is very similar to the Broadrick over
breadth standard.
City of Boerne spells out this new section 5 overbreadth approach:
"Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be appro
priate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected
by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being
55. Id.
56. Id. at 646-47; see also Fallon, supra note 10, at 1 336, 1356-58 (discussing Florida
Prepaid as an example of the congruence and proportionality test leading to facial invalida
tion).
57. 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997 ) ("[The Act's] [s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion at
every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every
description and regardless of subject matter.").
58. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
59. Salemo, 481 U.S. at 745.
60. 413 U.S. 601 (1973 ).

61. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
62. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
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unconstitutional."63 The logic of the standard proceeds as follows: If
there exists some aggregate number of state actions that are quite
likely to be unconstitutional, then there will be a concomitant number
of applications in which the challenged statute is truly remedial and
therefore appropriate under section 5. The statute will only be upheld
as an appropriate means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment,
however, in the event that this aggregate number reaches an unspeci
fied threshold (i.e., "many"). If this number falls short of this
threshold, the statute fails the test, even though there exists some posi
tive number of applications in which it might be considered valid.
Under Salerno, by contrast, the statute would be upheld in that situa
tion, since there exists at least one valid application.64 The number of
affected state actions with a signifi�ant likelihood of being unconstitu
tional plays the same role under the section 5 approach that the
"plainly legitimate sweep" of a statute plays under the First
Amendment overbreadth standard.65 Under both standards, the Court
assesses a facial challenge by comparing the incidence of invalid appli
cations relative to this legitimate sweep.66
An examination of the Court's approach in its recent section 5
cases reveals its similarity to the First Amendment overbreadth stan
dard.67 In City of Boerne, the Court focused on the "sweeping
63. 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997); accord Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88

(2000 ) ("[T]he ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to be held unconstitutional . . . .");
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647
(1999) ("In sum, it simply cannot be said that 'many of [the acts of infringement] affected by
the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.' "
(quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532)).

64. This assumes that a "valid application" occurs when the challenged statute actually
prevents or remedies a particular state action that has a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional. When the number of such applications is "many," the statute will be
upheld under both Salerno and the Court's new standard. When the number of such applica
tions is zero, the statute is invalid under both Salerno and the new test. The tests diverge
when the number of such applications is greater than zero but less than "many," in which
case the statute survives scrutiny under Salerno but fails the section 5 overbreadth approach.
For consideration of whether this assumption about what constitutes a "valid application" is
incorrect, see infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 584-85 (2002) (rejecting an overbreadth
challenge to the Child Online Protection Act because the breadth of invalid applications
resulting from the Act's deviation from the Miller definition of obscenity was not substantial
enough compared to the Act's legitimate sweep). There is a subtle difference between the
First Amendment and section 5 overbreadth standards. Whereas First Amendment over
breadth holds that a statute is invalid if its improper applications are substantial relative to
its legitimate sweep, section 5 overbreadth holds that a statute is valid if its legitimate appli
cations are "many" in relation to its illegitimate sweep. Under both approaches, the stan
dards rest on the ratio of valid to invalid applications, with account taken of how a statute
would operate in hypothetical circumstances.
67. In City of Boerne, Justice Kennedy explicitly stated the Court's concern about the
"possibility of overbreadth." 521 U.S. at 533. Some commentators have argued that the
Court similarly has replaced the Salerno standard with an overbreadth-type analysis in other
contexts, including its consideration of statutes regulating abortion. See Isserles, supra note
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coverage" of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA").68
Specifically, the Court found that RFRA "intru[ded] at every level of
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost
every description and regardless of subject matter."69 By comparison,
the Court found the Act's legitimate sweep to be relatively minimal,
noting that "[i]n most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are
not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry."70
RFRA's invalidity was predicated on this unfavorable ratio of legiti
mate to illegitimate applications.71
Later cases took the same approach. In Florida Prepaid, the Court
again focused on the Patent Remedy Act's "indiscriminate scope."72
Again, the potential application of the Act to state actions that were
not likely to be unconstitutional was too great relative to the plainly
legitimate sweep of the Act. Although the Act threatened to impose
"expansive liability" for an "unlimited range of state conduct,"
Congress had done nothing to "limit the coverage of the Act to cases
involving arguable constitutional violations" or to "confine the reach
of the Act by limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement."73
Similarly, in Kimel, the ADEA failed under the section 5 overbreadth
approach because it "prohibit[ed] substantially more state employ
ment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitu
tional under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard."74
The inquiry in these cases mirrors exactly the Broadrick formula of
a typical First Amendment overbreadth holding. In Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition,75 for example, the Court compared the terms of
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 against the First
Amendment standards for the regulation of obscenity, finding the
Act's definitions to exceed the definition of proscribable obscenity set
out in Miller v. California.76 As the Act reached substantially more ex1 0, at 456-63; King, supra note 16 (discussing
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
.
(1 992)).
68. City of Boerne, 52 1 U.S. at 532.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 535.
71. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. If the Court had applied the Salerno
standard, this ratio would be irrelevant. The only significant figure in that case would be the
number of legitimate applications; any number greater than one would defeat the f acial
challenge.
72. 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999).
73. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646-47.
74. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000).
75. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
76. 413 U.S. 1 5, 24 (1973) (defining proscribable obscenity as works depicting or de
scribing sexual conduct "which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex,
which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do
not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value").
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pressive conduct than would be obscene under the applicable First
Amendment standard, the Court held the Act to be unconstitutionally
overbroad.77
The Court's treatment of congressional findings in the City of
Boerne cases also reflects this section 5 overbreadth approach. In each
case, the Court has examined the legislative record in search of evi
dence to support the proposition that many affected state actions have
a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional. In Florida Prepaid
and Kimel, for example, Congress's findings did not indicate the
presence of sufficient unconstitutional patent infringement or em
ployment discrimination by states to constitute a "problem of national
import."78 Similarly, the findings supporting the Violence Against
Women Act were inadequate in United States v. Morrison79 because
they failed to demonstrate that many affected state actions were likely
to be unconstitutional.80 The absence of evidence of a widespread pat
tern or history of unconstitutional state action in these cases illustrated
that the legitimate sweep of the challenged statutes was too narrow to
justify the subset of hypothetical applications that were not truly re
medial or preventive of Fourteenth Amendment violations.81
One might disagree with this argument that th� City of Boerne
cases are more consistent with Broadrick than with Salerno by inter
preting Salerno, not as a test for facial validity, but as a description of
a statute that is unconstitutional on its face because of some defect
that taints the entire statute.82 A statute that is overly vague, for
example, gives too much discretion to administering officials and is
therefore impermissible.83 As Justice Breyer has explained, such a
statute is facially invalid even under the Salerno rule because too
much discretion exists in every application, regardless of whether that
discretion is properly exercised in a particular application.84 In other

77. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 258.
78. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641.
79. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
80. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (noting that even though the Act applied uniformly
nationwide, "Congress' findings indicate tha.t the problem of discrimination against the vic
tims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even most States").
81. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 ("Congress'[s] failure to uncover any significant pat
tern of unconstitutional discrimination here confirms that Congress had no reason to believe
that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this field.").
82. See Isserles, supra note 10, at 386 ("Salerno is best understood, not as a facial chal
lenge 'test' at all, but rather as a descriptive claim about a statute whose terms state an inva
lid rule of law: 'no set of circumstances' exists under which such a statute can be constitu
tionally applied.").
83. See Hill v. Colorado. 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000) ; City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
4 1, 56 (1999) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
84. Morales, 527 U.S. al 71 (Breyer, J., concurring):
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words, a court need not consider every conceivable application of a
statute to find that it fails the Salerno rule because some constitutional
defects, such as unlimited discretion, inhere in the terms of the statute
itself and therefore taint every application.85 Similarly, one could argue
that if the absence of congruence and proportionality under City of
Boerne is a deficiency that pervades an entire statute, then the facial
analysis in these cases is in fact perfectly consistent with the Salerno
standard.86
Some features of the City of Boerne cases suggest that they may be
consistent with this reading of Salerno . A principal deficiency in each
case, for example, was that the challenged statute imposed a greater
burden on state action than the relevant constitutional provision
imposed. Thus, in City of Boerne, RFRA prohibited state action that
substantially burdened religious practice unless it was the least restric
tive means of furthering a compelling state interest, even though the
First Amendment permitted such state action if it was neutral and
generally applicable.87 By applying this incorrect free exercise standard
to every state action, the Act arguably was invalid in every application.
If so, facial invalidation was appropriate even under Salerno. Simi
larly, in the ADEA, Congress had "effectively elevated the standard
for analyzing age discrimination to heightened scrutiny," even though
such discrimination is constitutionally permissible so long as it is ra
tional.88 Since this incorrect standard applied in every application of

The ordinance is unconstitutional. not because a policeman applied this discretion wisely or
poorly in a particular case, but rather because the policeman enjoys too much discretion in
every case. And if every application of the ordinance represents an exercise of unlimited dis
cretion, then the ordinance is invalid in all its applications.
85. In Professor Fallon's view, facial invalidation occurs because some doctrinal tests
mark a statute as invalid as a whole. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1326. Fallon argues that all
challenges are as-applied challenges, since a litigant must always assert that a statute may
not validly be applied in his case. Id. at 1327. But the reason for the statute's invalidity in the
litigant's particular case may be failure to satisfy a general substantive test that marks the
whole statute invalid. Id. at 1327-28. Defects that may render a statute invalid in every appli
cation include impermissible purpose; forbidden or suspect content; discrimination or
underinclusiveness; undue burden on a fundamental right; or unlimited administrative dis
cretion. See generally Dorf, supra note 10, at 251-53, 261-65, 279-81 ; Fallon, supra note 10, at
1 346-5 1 ; lsserles, supra note 10, at 440-46 .
86. This Section previously assumed that a "valid application" occurred when a chal
lenged statute actually prevents or remedies a particular state action that has a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional, and that the existence of such an application would
defeat a facial challenge under the Salerno rule. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
The present discussion questions the correctness of that assumption. If the absence of con
gruence and proportionality is a defect that renders an entire statute invalid, then applica
tion of the statute to unconstitutional state action in some cases cannot be considered a
"valid application"'capable of defeating a f acial challenge.
87. City of Boerne, 52 1 U.S. al 5 14-16 ( 1997) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 ( 1990)).
88. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000).
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the Act, the facial invalidation in Kimel arguably was perfectly consis
tent with Salerno.89
Additionally, the shortcomings in the legislath:e histories of the
statutes at issue in these cases may also have rendered the statutes
invalid in every application.90 In each case, the Court found that the
congressional findings failed to justify the need for prophylactic legis
lation.91 Accordingly, since every application of the statute is accom
panied by the same set of inadequate findings, the statute is arguably
invalid in all its applications.
Closer examination reveals that these holdings do not entail a
finding that the statutes are invalid in every application and therefore
cannot be described as consistent with Salerno. To conclude that the
City of Boerne cases are consistent with Salerno because the statutes
applied the wrong constitutional standard in every case would be to
stretch the Salerno standard wide enough to eliminate its principal ex
ception. If deviation from the relevant constitutional rule rendered a
statute invalid in all its applications, then any statute that burdened
protected expression by deviating from the relevant First Amendment
standard could also be described as invalid in all of its applications,
even where the deviation did not satisfy the requirement that over
breadth be "substantial."92 Under that expansive view of Salerno,
there would be no need for the overbreadth exception.93 To the extent
that any distinction is to be maintained between the two standards, the
Salerno rule cannot absorb either the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine or the City of Boerne cases that replicate it.94
89. See also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001) ("[The
ADA's] accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally required in that it makes
unlawful a range of alternate responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of
imposing an 'undue burden' upon the employer. The Act also makes it the employer's duty
to prove that it would suffer such a burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does)
that the complaining party negate reasonable bases for the employer's decision.").
90. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1357 ("[M]uch of the Court's analysis in Florida Prepaid
emphasized deficiencies in the Patent Remedy Act's historical origins involving Congress's
factfinding and deliberative processes. Conceivably the Court regarded the deliberative defi
ciencies as pervading every possible subrule into which the statute might be specified.").
91. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
92. On this theory, the Child Online Protection Act should have been struck down
under the Salerno rule because the statute applied an incorrect definition of proscribable
obscenity in each and every application. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). The
Court upheld the Act despite its deviation from the constitutional standard, however, be
cause the deviation was not of sufficient magnitude to reach a "substantial" amount of pro
tected conduct. Id. at 584-85.
93. Indeed, such a reading also erases the distinction between facial and as-applied
challenges. Any facial challenge in which a litigant claimed that a statute was impermissibly
overbroad could be recharacterized as an as-applied challenge because, under this expansive
reading, the overbreadth of the statute would render it invalid in every application, including
the application to the particular litigant. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1336-38.
94. Isserles has explained the distinction between the Salerno standard and the over
breadth standard. See Isserles, supra note 10, at 363-64. In his view, overbreadth "predicates
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Nor may deficiencies in Congress's findings be described as taint
ing every application of a statute. Evidence of a history or pattern of
widespread unconstitutional state action is necessary to justify pro
phylactic measures that affect a significant amount of constitutional
state action.95 Applications of a remedial statute to core constitutional
violations are valid by definition and presumably do not require
support in the legislative record.96 The congruence and proportionality
test developed in City of Boerne
including its attention to legislative
findings - applies with regard to prophylactic statutes that restrain
constitutional state action as a means of remedying unconstitutional
state action.97 This standard does not require legislative findings to
demonstrate the congruence and proportionality of a statute that by
its very terms applies only to core constitutional violations.98 As such,
when a statute reaches both core constitutional violations and conduct
that is not itself unconstitutional, it is only the existence of the latter
category of applications that calls for an analysis of Congress's
findings. Any inadequacy in those findings damages only those appli
cations of the statute that lie at the periphery of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It cannot be said to render the statute invalid in every
application.
-

facial invalidity on some aggregate number of unconstitutional applications of an otherwise
valid rule of law," while Salerno describes a valid rule facial challenge, which "predicates
facial invalidity on a constitutional defect inhering in the terms of the statute itself, inde
pendent of the statute's application to particular cases." Id. In a typical First Amendment
overbreadth case, a litigant who has engaged in constitutionally proscribable conduct chal
lenges a statute by arguing that it reaches others whose conduct is constitutionally protected.
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 41 3 U.S. 601 , 612 (1973). The extension of such a statute to pro
tected conduct may result from the statute's incorporation of a definition of prohibited con
duct that deviates from the constitutional rule. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130, 1 32-33 (1974) (invalidating a Louisiana ordinance that prohibited "curs[ing],"
"revil[ing]," and using "obscene or opprobrious language" toward a police officer because
the ordinance reached beyond the constitutional definition of proscribable fighting words).
Whether to call such a statute "overbroad" or to describe it as "invalid in every application"
is more than a semantic distinction, since overbreadth must be "substantial" before the stat
ute may be invalidated on its face. See ACLU, 535 U.S. at 584-85.
95. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000) ("Difficult and intracta
ble problems often require powerful remedies, and we have never held that § 5 precludes
Congress from enacting reasonably prophylactic legislation. . . . One means by which we
have made such a determination in the past is by examining the legislative record containing
the reasons for Congress'[s] action."); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1 997)
( "While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a
congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of
remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.").
96. See supra note 26.
97. See supra note 26.
98. Consider, for example, a federal statute prohibiting states from intentionally main
taining racially segregated public schools. The statute unquestionably would constitute an
appropriate . means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment because the prohibited state
action clearly violates that Amendment. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Whether Congress amassed a legislative record detailing the existence of a widespread pat
tern of segregated schools would be irrelevant. See supra note 26.
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B. Section Five Overbreadth as a Departure from Precedent
The section 5 overbreadth approach adopted in the City of Boerne
cases departs from the Court's traditional method of adjudicating con
stitutional challenges to federal statutes and from its earlier section 5
decisions. United States v. Raines<J<J provides the archetypal rule. In that
case, the Court considered the constitutionality under the Fifteenth
Amendment of the Civil Rights Act of 1 957, which authorized the
United States to sue any person who interfered with the right to vote
on the basis of race.wo Although the defendant in the case was a state
official, the district court invalidated the Act because of its potential
application to private persons.w1 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that "if the complaint here called for an application of the statute
clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, that should
have been an end to the question of constitutionality."102 The scope of
the Court's inquiry was thus confined to the statute as it was applied in
the factual context before the Court.
This general approach has governed most areas of constitutional
adjudication outside the First Amendment context.103 Although few in
number, the Court's pre-City of Boerne cases discussing the constitu
tionality of enforcement legislation under the Reconstruction
Amendments were no exception.104 These earlier cases discussed the
99. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
100. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
101. Id. at 20.
102. Id. at 24-25. The Court's unwillingness to reach a decision that exceeded the scope
of the complaint reflected concerns about the proper scope of judicial review. Noting that
"[t]he very foundation of the power of the federal courts to declare Acts of Congress uncon
stitutional lies in the power and duty of those courts to decide cases and controversies prop
erly befo re them," id. at 20, the Court concluded that "[t]he delicate power of pronouncing
an Act of Congress unconstitutional is nol to be exercised with reference to hypothetical
cases . . " Id. at 22. As Professor Fallon has noted, the rationale of the Raines decision also
related to principles of statutory interpretation. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1 330-3 1 . In par
ticular, the full meaning of a statute might not be clear in a hypothetical application; invalid
portions might also be subject to severing or a limiting construction. Id.
. .

103. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 197. As has been noted, the Court de
veloped exceptional rules in the First Amendment context. In so doing, the Court noted its
reluctance to depart from the usual rule of Raines: "These principles rest on more than the
fussiness of judges. They reflect the conviction that under our constitutional system courts
are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws."
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 , 610-1 1 (1 973); see also Monaghan, supra note 10, at
279 (noting that the principles developed in Raines and other cases "reflected a powerful and
pervasive view of the nature of constitutional adjudication, the animating premise of which
denied that courts possessed a general commission to make pronouncements on the meaning
of the Constitution or to enfo rce public norms").
104. The dearth of cases decided under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment prior to
the mid-l 990s resulted primarily from the ease with which federal legislation could be
upheld under Congress's broad power to regulate interstate commerce. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-59 (1995) (reviewing modem commerce clause jurisprudence).
When the Court held in 1 996 that Congress could only abrogate state sovereign immunity
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validity of statutes in terms of the factual context of particular cases.
Moreover, the holdings in those earlier cases did not reach beyond
that context. The Court maintained this application-oriented approach
throughout its cases considering the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.105 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,106 for example,
the Court relied on Raines to confine its analysis only to those provi
sions of the Act properly before the Court.107 The Court's discussion of
the validity of each challenged provision focused on its application in
South Carolina.108 The appropriateness of the Act's prohibition on the
use of literacy tests and other devices, for example, was measured
in light of South Carolina's historically discriminatory use of such
devices.109
Subsequent section 5 cases continued to follow the Raines method.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,110 the Court began its analysis of section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act by noting that the scope of its inquiry
was limited by the scope of the plaintiffs' challenge.111 The Court
proceeded to consider the rationality of that section by reference to its
application to the plaintiffs and concluded that by prohibiting the
State of New York from denying the right to vote to large segments of
its Puerto Rican community, section 4(e) furthered the aims of the
when exercising its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, see Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), it became necessary to assess the validity of legislation under
section 5 regardless of its validity under the commerce clause. See, e.g. , Kimel v. Florida Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-80 (2000) (noting that the Court had previously upheld the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act as a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce, but that Seminole Tribe required determination of the Act's validity
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Accordingly, the Court considered section 5
issues more sporadically prior to the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, those cases did follow the
ordinary methods of adjudication set out in Raines. See infra notes 105-119 and accompany
ing text. Moreover, cases evaluating legislation under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment
customarily govern section 5 cases (and vice versa), because Congress's power under those
enforcement clauses is treated as co-extensive. See, e.g. , Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 651 (1966).
105. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (J 966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
106. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). At first glance, the Court's decision in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach appears to analyze the Voting Rights Act on its face. South Carolina had filed a
claim under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking a declaratory judgment that
the statute was unconstitutional and raising no issues of fact. Id. at 307.
107. Id. at 3 17 (finding South Carolina's challenge to certain provisions of the Act to be
"premature" because "[n]o person ha[d] yet been subjected to, or even threatened with, the
criminal sanctions which these sections of the Act authorize" (citing Raines, 362 U.S. at 2024).
108. See id. at 333-34 (discussing the application of the Voting Rights Act's coverage
formula in South Carolina and the discriminatory use of literacy tests and other devices in
South Carolina).
109. See id.
110. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
111. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 644 n.3.

·
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Equal Protection Clause and was therefore valid under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.112 Relying on Raines, the Court also rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that section 4(e) itself violated the Equal
Protection Clause because the plaintiffs lacked a "sufficient personal
interest" to raise the argument.113 The Court's section 5 analysis ac
cordingly was highly attuned to the factual context and the scope of
the case before it.114
Just as the City of Boerne cases departed from the Court's general
rules with the initial move toward adjudicating these section 5 cases as
facial challenges, the application of an overbreadth standard to assess
the success of those challenges likewise diverges from the Court's
earlier cases. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, for example, the Court made
clear that Congress could enact legislation under section 5 that
reached state action that did not violate the Constitution.115 This
holding in no way depended on the actual existence of many affected
state actions that had a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional;
all the Court required was that Congress rationally might have
determined that the legislation furthered the aims of the Fourteenth
Amendment.116 Finding such a rational basis, the Court upheld this
"overbroad" statute that prohibited a substantial amount of state
conduct that was not unconstitutional.117 The Court continued this ap
proach in City of Rome v. United States,118 upholding portions of the
Voting Rights Act without requiring any threshold number of state ac-

1 1 2. Id. at 652.
1 1 3. Id. at 657.
1 14. More recently, the Court considered the validity under the Fifteenth Amendment
of certain preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act. City ofRome v. United States
continued the as-applied approach of the earlier section 5 cases by framing the issue as
whether the Act "may not properly be applied to the electoral changes and annexations
disapproved by the Attorney General." 446 U.S. 156, 1 72 (1980). Dissenting from the
Court's decision to uphold the Act, then-Justice Rehnquist repeatedly grounded his discus
sion of the statute in the facts of the particular case, see, e.g., id. at 207, 209, 210 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting), at times arguing that the majority had not placed enough weight on those
facts. See id. at 214 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("What the Court explicitly ignores is that in
this case the city has proved that these changes are not discriminatory in purpose. Neither
reason nor precedent supports the conclusion that here it is 'appropriate' for Congress to at
tempt to prevent purposeful discrimination by prohibiting conduct which a locality proves is
not purposeful discrimination." (emphasis added)).
1 15. 384 U.S. at 648-49 (noting that requiring a judicial determination that the state ac
tion was unconstitutional would reduce the legislative power "to the insignificant role of ab
rogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitu
tional . . . ) .
"

1 16. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-56.

117. Id. at 653-56.
118. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). As has been noted, the same principles apply to the Court's
analyses of legislation enacted under both section 5 of the Fourteenth .Amendment and
section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. See supra note 104.
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tions that were likely to be unconstitutional.119 Accordingly, the City of
Boerne cases represent a clear departure from previous section 5
precedent.
II. PATHOLOGIES OF SECTION FIVE 0VERBREADTH
By invalidating statutes because they potentially reach too much
constitutional state action relative to their plainly legitimate sweep,
the Court's section 5 overbreadth approach departs from the tradi
tional rules governing facial challenges and from its previous section 5
cases. In forging this approach, however, the Court has not explicitly
addressed its merits or drawbacks. 120 This Part considers some difficul
ties of this new approach, arguing that it raises questions in several
settled areas of law. Section II.A argues that the new approach of the
City of Boerne cases conflicts with several principles relating to the
proper scope of judicial review. Section Il.B contends that the new
approach is also out of step with settled principles of statutory
severability. Section Il.C argues that this approach is inconsistent with
the substantive standards guiding the Court's recent section 5 deci
sions. Finally, Section 11.D considers and rejects a federalism-based
justification for this new approach.
A. The Proper Scope ofJudicial Review
The Court's new approach to adjudicating challenges to section 5
legislation conflicts with several fundamental principles limiting the
power of courts to invalidate acts of Congress. In particular, this ap
proach appears to exceed the proper scope of judicial review by
departing from traditional axioms relating to separation of powers,
deference to legislative judgments, and the function of courts to adju
dicate concrete cases and controversies. Such a development is par
ticularly incongruous with the Court's efforts in the City of Boerne
cases to reinforce the appropriate division of responsibility between
Congress and the courts.121
1 19. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 1 77. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion in City of Rome
makes clear that overbreadth was not fatal under the pre-Boerne standards. See id. at 193
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("I think it is equally clear that remedies for discriminatory prac
tices that were widespread within a State may be applied to every governmental unit within
the State even though some of those local units may have never engaged in purposeful dis
crimination themselves.").
120. See supra note 20.
12 1. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (emphasizing the distinc
tion between Congress's "sphere of power and responsibilities" and the "province of the Ju
dicial Branch"); see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV 4, 135-36 (2001) (describing City of Boerne as illustrative of the
Rehnquist Court's efforts to assert judicial supremacy in the area of constitutional interpre
tation).
.
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As the Court has consistently observed, the justification for the ex
ercise of judicial review first expressed in Marbury v. Madison122 de
rives from the necessity of determining the constitutional validity of a
statute in order to decide a specific case or controversy.123 Moreover,
the appropriate exercise of judicial review is further bounded by the
constitutional separation of powers and the attendant deference owed
to the legislature by the courts.124 These principles explained the
as-applied posture the Court adopted in its section 5 cases prior to
City of Boerne.125 Even in one of its more recent section 5 cases, the
Court has acknowledged that "[d]ue respect for the decisions of a
coordinate branch of Government demands that [the Court] invalidate
a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress
has exceeded its constitutional bounds."126
In recognition of these general principles of judicial review, the
Court has long adhered to several specific rules of restraint, all of
which are implicated by the Court's new approach to analyzing section
5 legislation. Principal among these rules is that a court should decide
only concrete cases: "The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of
Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to
hypothetical cases thus imagined."127 This preference derives not only

122. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803):

So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a
particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law. disre·
garding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law: the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence
of judicial duty.
1 23. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 61 1 (1973) ("Constitutional judg
ments, as Mr. Chief J ustice Marshall recognized, are justified only out of the necessity of
adjudicating rights in particular cases between the litigants brought before the Court . . . . ");
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1960) ("The very foundation of the power of the
fe deral courts to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional lies in the power and duty of
those courts to decide cases· and controversies properly before them . . . . This Court, as is the
case with all federal courts, 'has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or
of the United States, void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called
upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.' " (quoting Liverpool,
N.Y. & Phil. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))).
124. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 1 1 1 HARV. L. REV 153, 1 85-88 (1997) (discussing the incompatibility be
tween the holding in City of Boerne and the "presumption of constitutionality"). Noting that
"[i]t is often said that within a certain range of legitimate interpretations of the Constitution
courts must defer to the decisions of the elected branches," id. at 1 85, Professor McConnell
argues that "for several reasons, Boerne was an especially appropriate case for application of
the presumption [of constitutionality].'' Id. at 186.
.

1 25. See supra Section l.B.
126. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000).
127. Raines, 362 U.S. at 22; accord Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar
Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 ( 1 912) ("[T]his court must deal with the case in hand and not with
imaginary ones."); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 1 97 (noting the policy that "to
permit adjudication to turn on hypothetical disputes would give too abstract a flavor to con-
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from the Marbury justification for judicial review,128 but also from the
institutional argument that optimal judicial decisio.nmaking occurs in
the context of an adversarial process presenting specific and concrete
facts and legal issues.129
As both courts and commentators have recognized, entertaining a
facial challenge that is not anchored in the facts of a particular case is
necessarily in tension with this preference for concrete cases.130 By
pronouncing on the validity of section 5 legislation by reference to
hypothetical applications, the Court has exercised its "delicate power"
in a manner that collides with "the conviction that under our constitu
tional system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass
judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws."131 Despite this apparent
discord between the use of overbreadth analysis in the section 5
context and the principles favoring adjudication of concrete cases, the
Court has not offered any "weighty countervailing policies"132
warranting an exception to these principles in the section 5 context.
A second rule of restraint developed in recognition of the proper
scope of judicial review is the axiom that a court ought not to
formulate a holding that is broader than is necessary to vindicate the
legal rights of the parties to the case before the court.133 In particular,
the Court has noted that "a federal court should not extend its invali·

stitutional litigation"); Fallon, supra note to, at 1 330 (noting the rule favoring adjudication
of concrete cases between particular individuals and not hypothetical cases).
1 28. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 82. Whether litigation is viewed
under a private-rights or public-rights model, certain "functional requisites of effective adju
dication" are satisfied only in the context of a concrete case or controversy. Id. These in
clude "a concrete set of facts as an aid to the accurate formulation of the legal issue to be
decided;" "an adversary presentation of evidence as an aid to the accurate determination of
the facts out of which the legal issue arises;" "an adversary presentation in the formulation
and decision of the legal issue;" and "a concrete set of facts [to limit] the scope and implica
tions of the legal determination, and as an aid to its accurate interpretation." Id.
130. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 74-77 (1 999) (Scalia, J., dissent
ing) (noting that the rationale supporting judicial review "only extends so far as to require us
to determine that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to this party, in the circumstances
of this case," and that it is "fundamentally incompatible with [the constitutional system) for
the Court not to be content to find that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to the person
before it, but to go further and pronounce that the statute is unconstitutional in all applica
tions"); lsserles, supra note 10, at 361 (noting the inherent tension between facial invalida
tion and "core principles underpinning Article I l l courts that require resolution of concrete
disputes . . . . ") .
131. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973); see also Morales, 527 U.S. at
77 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing a holding that a statute is unconstitutional in all applica
tions instead of as applied to the person before the court as "no more than an advisory
opinion - which a federal court should never issue at all . . . . ) .
"

132. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611 (quoting Raines, 362 U.S. at 22-23).
133. Raines, 362 U.S. at 21 (recognizing the rule "never to formulate a rule of constitu
tional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied" (quoting
Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 1 13 U.S. 33, 39 ( 1885))).

February 2003)

Section Five Overbreadth

1051

dation of a statute further than necessary to dispose of the case before
it."134 From this premise, it follows that if a litigant can prevail on an
as-applied challenge, the court should not reach the question of over
breadth.135 Thus, even if each statute challenged in the City of Boerne
cases exceeded Congress's enforcement power as applied to the de
fendant states in those cases, the analyses and holdings of those cases
clash with this rule disfavoring facial invalidation that exceeds what is
necessary to resolve the controversy before the court.136
Finally, the method of adjudication adopted in the Court's recent
section 5 decisions is at odds with courts' obligation to avoid de
ciding constitutional questions unnecessarily and to construe statutes
to avoid constitutional infirmities where possible.137 As Justice
Frankfurter remarked, "To deal with legislation so as to find unconsti
tutionality is to reverse the duty of courts to apply a statute so as to
save it."138 Like other rules of judicial restraint, this precept recognizes
deference to the legislature as a limit on the proper scope of judicial
review.139 In the City of Boerne cases, the Court has passed over the
as-applied questions and moved directly to examining the degree of
overbreadth in the challenged statutes.140 Just like the First
Amendment approach they replicate, these cases proceed by seeking
1 34. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 , 502 (1 985).
1 35. See id. at 504-06 (reversing a facial invalidation of a statute regulating obscenity
and holding that the statute should have been invalidated only insofa r as it reached pro
tected materials); see also Isserles, supra note 10, at 454-55 (discussing the general rule that a
court should not invalidate a statute further than necessary to dispose of the immediate
case).
136. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educational Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, fo r example, the Court discussed the Patent Remedy Act's inappropriateness in cases
of remedied or unintentional patent infringement, even though those considerations were
not raised on the facts of the case. 527 U.S. 627, 645-47 (1 999). According to Brockett, this
pronouncement should have been avoided if the Act was in fact inappropriate as applied in
the actual circumstances before the Court. 472 U.S. at 504-06. It may be argued that the
Act's invalidity in the potential applications to remedied or unintentional patent infringe
ment was the very reason for its invalidity in the particular factual context of the case, and
that this pronouncement was therefore a necessary step in the Court's reasoning. See Florida
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645-47. This argument, however, parallels the reasoning of a First
Amendment overbreadth analysis. see supra Section I.A, which was precisely the kind of
argument fa cing the Brockett Court when it reiterated "the normal rule that partial, rather
than facial, invalidation is the required course." 472 U.S. at 504.
137. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council. 485 U.S. 568, 575 ( 1988) ("Another rule of statutory construction, however, is per
tinent here: where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious con
stitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.").
138. Raines, 362 U.S. at 28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
139. See DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575 ("This approach . . . recognizes that Congress. like
this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will there
fore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties
or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it.").
140. See supra Section I.A.
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out potential unconstitutional applications. As a result, the Court has
missed possible opportunities to avoid constitutional issues through
use of limiting constructions.141 Thus, the Court's method of adjudi
cating the City of Boerne cases strikes a dissonant note in light of the
courts' obligation to avoid constitutional difficulties.
In response to this indictment of the Court's new section 5 over
breadth approach, one might argue that each of these inconsistencies
arises in the First Amendment overbreadth context as well. When a
court searches for impermissible overbreadth in a statute that burdens
protected expression, it considers how the statute might apply in hypo
thetical cases and often invalidates statutes in their entirety.142 If an
approach that is inconsistent with principles of judicial review is per
missible in the First Amendment context, one might argue that such
conflicts likewise raise no difficulties in the City of Boerne cases.
In the First Amendment context, however, these conflicts are
tolerated because of the privileged status of the individual rights at
stake and because of the likelihood that persons not before the court
will be deterred from exercising their expressive rights.143 In the
Court's view, expressive rights are not only foundational to individual
freedom and autonomy144 but also uniquely vulnerable to inhibition: a
court must consider the potential impact of a statute in hypothetical
cases because persons not before the court might never risk prosecu
tion by engaging in protected expression that appears to be prohib
ited.145 No direct analogue to this reasoning arises in the section 5
context.146 The paramount importance of individual expressive rights is
not at stake, and there is no obvious chilling effect on states' ability or
willingness to raise constitutional challenges to section 5 statutes.
1 4 1 . Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 , 613 (1973) ("Facial overbreadth has not
been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged
statute."); l sserles, supra note 1 0, at 361 (asserting that facial invalidation is in tension with
the courts' obligation to determine constitutional questions only as a matter of last resort).
In a way, this fa ilure to consider limiting constructions before invoking overbreadth and the
failure to consider statutory severability are opposite sides of the same coin. See infra note
1 69.
142. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 247-49 (2002) (consider
ing the hypothetical application of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1 996 to literary
works and contemporary films).
1 43. See id. at 244 ("The Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws
that chill speech within the First Amendment's vast and privileged sphere."); see also infra
note 1 88 and accompanying text.
1 44. See id. at 253 ("The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be
protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.").
1 45. Id. at 244 ("[T]his case provides a textbook example of why we permit facial chal
lenges to statutes that burden expression. With these severe penalties in force, few legitimate
movie producers or book publishers, or few other speakers in any capacity, would risk dis
tributing images in or near the uncertain reach of this law.").
146. For a discussion of whether states' rights serve to justify these deviations from or
dinary principles of judicial review, see infra Section 1 1 .D.
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Accordingly, these conflicts between the section 5 overbreadth ap
proach and the proper scope of judicial review cannot be defended as
a parallel to First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
B. Severability
In each of the City of Boerne cases, the Court has invalidated sec
tion 5 legislation on the basis of statutory provisions or applications
that were not implicated by the specific facts or claims raised. By
passing over the question of whether those provisions or applications
were separable from those raised in the cases before the Court, the
Court's recent section 5 cases are inconsistent with "well estab
lished"1 47 principles of statutory severability.
In general, the severability question asks whether the invalidity of
one portion of a statute renders the remainder of the statute ineffec
tive.148 The Court has called it an "elementary principle" that "the
same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional,
and that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which
is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be
rejected."149 Adherence to this principle ensures that the judicial
power to invalidate acts of Congress does not encroach on the consti
tutional separation of powers by striking down more of a statute than
is necessary in a given case.150
Challenges to federal statutes151 may raise questions of severability
in a number of possible procedural postures.152 For example, a litigant
challenging a statute on its face might argue that if any single provi
sion or application of the statute is both unconstitutional and nonsev
erable, then the statute is invalid in toto.153 Alternatively, a litigant
1 47. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 683 (1987) {holding the legislative veto
contained in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 to be severable from the rest of the Act).
1 48. See generally John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993);
Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L.
REV. 76 ( 1937).
149. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985) (quoting Allen v.
Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83-84 (188 1 )).
150. See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 1 48, at 226 ("Striking down an entire statute as nonsev
erable when the legislature intended otherwise expands judicial power. The invalidation of
statutory provisions that the legislature wanted to enact, that are within the legislature's
power to enact, and that the legislature could unquestionably enact standing alone corre
spondingly decreases the power of the legislature.").
1 98.

1 5 1 . On severability analysis of state statutes, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note JO, at
1 52. Nagle. supra note 1 48, at 208-09.

1 53. Id. at 208. In New York v. United States, for example, the petitioners challenged the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1 985 in its entirety. 505 U.S. 1 44
(1992). Having held the take title provision of the Act to be unconstitutional. the Court pro
ceeded to address the severability question, finding that the provision was severable and the
remainder of the Act could be left in force. Id. at 1 86-87. Similarly, in Buckley v. Valeo, the
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might claim that a particular statutory provision that is not itself
unconstitutional is nevertheless ineffective because of its nonsev
erability from another, purportedly unconstitutional, provision.154
Finally, a litigant might challenge a particular application of a statute
as invalid because it is not severable from other purportedly unconsti
tutional applications.155
In whatever form it arises, the severability question is governed by
a well-established standard: "Unless it is evident that the Legislature
would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if
what is left is fully operative as a law."156 Like many approaches to
·statutory interpretation,157 this test calls for an examination of legisla
tive intent through inspection of the structure, purpose, and legislative
history of the challenged statute.158 Application of the test also focuses
Court applied severability analysis to decide whether a portion of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1 97 1 upheld against a facial challenge was nevertheless ineffective because
other portions of the Act were unconstitutional. 424 U.S. 1, 1 08-09 ( 1976) . The Court held
the provision to be severable. Id.
1 54. Nagle, supra note 148, at 208. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock is illustrative. 480 U.S.
678 ( 1987 ) . There. the plaintiffs challenged certain provisions of the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 on the grounds that they were not severable from the purportedly unconstitu
tional legislative veto also contained in the Act. hi. at 680. The Court concluded that the
provisions were severable. Id. at 697.
1 55. Nagle, supra note 1 48, at 208-09. Wyoming v. Oklahoma illustrates the problem of
separable applications. 502 U.S. 437 ( 1992 ) . There, the Court considered the severability of
the unconstitutional application of an Oklahoma law to private corporations engaged in in
terstate commerce from the permissible application of the same law to a state agency en
gaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 459-61. As Nagle has noted, these examples do not ex
haust the situations in which severability might become an issue. Nagle, supra note 1 48, at
208-09. In l.N.S. v. Chadha, for example. severability became an issue when the government
argued that if the petitioner's constitutional challenge prevailed, it would render the chal
lenged statute invalid in toto, including its remedial provisions, thereby depriving the peti
tioner of any avenue for relief under the statute. 462 U.S. 919, 931 ( 1983) .
156. New York v. United States, .:ms U.S. at 186 (quoting Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at
684) ; accord Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-32; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108; Champlin Refining Co. v.
Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 ( 1932) . For criticisms of how the Court has applied this
test, see Nagle. supra note 148, at 206, 21 1 , which notes the general shortcomings of the test
and argues that the focus on legislative intent is appropriate but that the analysis searches
for that intent incorrectly, and Stern, supra note 148, at 1 1 1-14, which argues that the Court's
severability decisions cannot be neatly reconciled and frequently reflect the Court's attitudes
toward the merits of the underlying claims.
1 57. Nagle has noted the similarities between severability analysis and other problems
in statutory interpretation. Nagle, supra note 148, at 257 ("[T]he issue of severability is no
different than other questions of statutory construction.").
158. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines. 480 U.S. at 687-96 (discussing both the structure of the
Act and its legislative history as evidence of Congress's intent regarding severability);
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 ( 1985) ("Partial invalidation would be
improper if it were contrary to legislative intent in the sense that the legislature has passed
an inseverable Act or would not have passed it had it known the challenged provision was
invalid."); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932-34 (focusing on legislative intent in relation to severabil
ity). As Nagle has argued, the central role of legislative intent in the severability inquiry
guards against excessively legislative behavior by courts. Nagle, supra note 1 48, at 226 ("[I]f
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on the operability of the statute in the absence of the unconstitutional
provisions.159
Although no majority Supreme Court opinion has explicitly
announced a presumption of severability,160 such a presumption - or
at least a strong preference - appears to operate in the Court's
severability decisions.161 Some of the Court's language states that in
the absence of clear evidence of contrary legislative intent or conse
quent inoperability of the statute, the unconstitutional provision
"must" be severed.162 Moreover, other principles of constitutional ad
judication, including the Salerno standard governing facial challenges,
arguably embody a presumption of severability.163 The strength of this
tendency in favor of severability is demonstrated empirically by the
rarity with which the Court invalidates statutes as inseverable.164
Accordingly, although it need not be a threshold question in every

a court construes a statute as severable contrary to the legislature's intent, the statutory pro
visions that remain in effect are akin to a new statute of the court's design, not the legisla
ture's.").
159. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 1 86-87 (focusing on whether the
statute would still serve Congress's objectives in the absence of the invalid provision);
A laska A irlines, 480 U.S. at 684 ("Congress could not have intended a constitutionally
flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the legisla
tion is incapable of functioning independently."); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934 ("A provision is
further presumed severable if what remains after severance 'is fully operative as a law.' "
(quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932))).
1 60. A four-Justice plurality in Regan v. Time, Inc. asserted that the "presumption" was
in favor of severability. 468 U.S. 641 , 653 (1984). Nagle has found that the lower federal
courts rely on this statement. Nagle. supra note 148, at 220. The Court has made clear that a
presumption of severability does arise when a statute contains a clause stipulating to its sev
erability. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932.
161. On historical shifts in the Court's severability presumptions, see Nagle, supra note
148, at 218; Stern, supra note 148, at 79.
162. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685 ("[T]he unconstitutional provision must
be severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not

have enacted."). The Alaska Airlines Court also quoted with approval the admonition of the
Regan plurality that "whenever an act of Congress contains unobjectionable provisions sepa
rable from those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of this court to so declare, and to
maintain the act in so far as it is valid.'' Id. at 684 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
163. See Dorf. supra note 1 0, at 250-51 (discussing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987)). Professor Dorf argues that the Salerno standard for assessing the success of facial
challenges - requiring a challenger to show that "no set of circumstances exists" in which
the statute would be valid - necessarily entails a presumption of severability because it as
sumes that if there existed any valid applications, "a court should construe them as a
separate, constitutional Act." Id. at 250. "Conversely," Dorf continues, "if a statute has no
constitutional applications, then no statute remains after a court severs the unconstitutional
applications." Id.; see also Fallon, supra note 10, at 1333 (discussing the adjudicative ap
proach of United States v. Raines as embodying a presumption of statutory severability).
1 64. As of 1 993, the Court had not invalidated a single statute as inseverable since the
1 930s. Nagle, supra note 1 48, at 220.
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case,165 this near-presumption suggests that a court should not invali
date a federal statute on the basis of extraneous provisions or applica
tions without explicitly addressing whether those provisions or appli
cations may be severed from the portion of the statute at issue in the
case.166
Notwithstanding these established principles, the Court in City of
Boerne and subsequent section 5 cases has omitted any severability
analysis despite its clear relevance in those cases.167 In Florida Prepaid,
for example, the Court assessed the validity of the Patent Remedy Act
in a case involving willful patent infringement in part by reference to
the statute's applicability in cases of negligent patent infringement.168
Even assuming that the Act exceeded Congress's section 5 power
when applied to negligent patent infringements, the normal course of
action in such a situation would be to assess whether that purportedly
unconstitutional application could be severed or whether it rendered
the entire statute invalid.169 That is, the invalidity of the statute as
165. Severability is often a threshold question, see Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 680;
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 93 1 . but the Court occasionally decides the constitutional questions first,
addressing severability only after a statutory provision has been held unconstitutional. See
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 155, 1 86 (1992); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 , 1 08
(1 976).
166. Principles of judicial review and separation of powers also counsel in favor of a pre
sumption of severability. See Nagle, supra note 148, at 250 (arguing that a rule fa voring sev
erability is justified by the principles that (I) statutes should be construed to avoid constitu
tional questions; (2) statutes are presumed to be constitutional; (3) where possible, a
constitutional construction of a statute should be adopted; (4) a court should give effect to a
statute to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution; and (5) a court should strike
down only those portions of a statute that are necessary to resolve the immediate case);
Stern, supra note 148, at 84 (arguing that severability is supported by the considerations that
litigants may only complain about a statute insofa r as it is applied to their disadvantage. that
courts should deal with real cases as opposed to imaginary ones, and that courts should apply
a saving construction to a statute where possible). Bw see Stern, supra note 148, at 85
(noting that the act of invalidating select statutory language or construing a statute more
narrowly than its plain meaning may constitute the making of new law properly reserved to
the legislature).
1 67. None of the six section 5 cases since City of Boerne address any issue of severabil
ity. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) ; Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 ( 1 999); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 ( 1 999); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 52 1 U.S. 507 (1 997).
1 68. 527 U.S. at 645; see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
1 69. Cf. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 680 (asking whether a purportedly unconstitutional
statutory provision was severable from the challenged portion of the statute). The severabil
ity problem in Florida Prepafrl differs from the Alaska Airlines problem in that it involves a
problem of separable applications of a single statutory provision instead of separable statu
tory language. Stern has noted that the problem of separable language is easier than the
problem of separable applications because it does not require a court to read limiting words
into a statute or deal with the indefiniteness that results from permitting language to stand
while restricting its meaning. Stern, supra note 1 48, at 1 06. Nevertheless, the same general
principles govern both inquiries. See id. at 82-83; see also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S.
437, 460-61 (1992) (acknowledging the possibility that "if application of a statute to some
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applied to negligent patent infringements ordinarily would not render
the remainder of the statute invalid unless the Court found that appli_
cation to be nonseverable.170 Nevertheless, the Florida Prepaid Court
did not consider the severability question.1 71
More generally, the logic of the section 5 overbreadth approach by
definition omits analysis of severability. The approach developed in
the City of Boerne cases focuses on the ratio of a challenged statute's
illegitimate sweep to the number of affected stat� actions that have a
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.172 Under this ap
proach, the existence of a sufficient number of invalid applications
renders the remaining provisions invalid.173 Inherently, this approach
conflicts with the Court's ordinary principles of severability, under
which the existence of unconstitutional applications would only re
quire invalidation of the entire statute if those applications could not
be severed from the remainder of the statute.
In this respect, the City of Boerne cases depart even further from
the traditional severability analysis than the First Amendment over
breadth standard. Although the practice of invalidating a statute be
cause it may burden protected expression in circumstances not before

classes is found unconstitutional, severance of those classes permits application to the
acceptable classes"). Professor Fallon has described the separable applications of a statute as
"subrules" which are amenable to severing in the same way as distinct statutory provisions.
See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1333-34. The caveat on the problem of separable applications is
that "any separation of a statute through its specification into subrules must not cross the
vague line that divides judicial interpretation from judicial legislation." Id. at 1333; see also
Stern, supra note 148, at 85. Accordingly, a court considering whether to sever different ap
plications of the same statutory language should observe the same principles governing the
imposition of any limiting construction, namely that the statute must be "readily susceptible"
to such a construction. Fallon, supra note 10, at 1 333; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
884 (1997) (analyzing the severability of statutory applications in light of the rule that a court
"may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is 'readily susceptible' to such a
construction").
1 70. See A laska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 680; see also Fallon, supra note 10, at 1349 ("In
cases involving federal statutes, the Supreme Court typically assumes that invalid subrules
should be treated as separable from valid ones when Congress would presumably have
wanted that result and a court can identify lines of severance that are consistent with a
statute's structure and purpose.").

1 7 1 . See 527 U.S. 627 (1 999). In contrast to the Supreme Court's approach, the district
court that considered the validity of the abrogation of sovereign immunity in the Americans
with Disabilities Act in Kilcullen v. New York State Department of Transportation adhered to
ordinary principles of severability. 33 F. Supp. 2d 133, 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). As has been
noted, see supra notes 1 -6 and accompanying text, the plaintiffs claim in that case did not
implicate the reasonable accommodation requirement of the ADA. Id. at 144. Nevertheless,
the court concluded that the constitutionality of the statute as a whole depended on the va
lidity of that requirement because it could not be severed from the rest of the statute. Id.
(noting that "the aspect on which [the plaintiff rested) his claim ha[d] no separate textual
manifestation from the accommodation requirement").
1 72. See supra Section I.A.
173. See supra Section I.A.
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the Court is also in tension with the principle of severability,174 even in
the First Amendment context the Court generally entertains the pos
sibility of imposing a limiting construction before invalidating a statute
as facially overbroad} 75 Accordingly, the collision between the section
5 overbreadth approach and principles of severability cannot be
defended by analogy to the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
C.

Internal Inconsistencies in the City of Boerne Cases

A final cause for concern iri evaluating the Court's new section 5
overbreadth approach arises from an apparent inconsistency between
the method of adjudication in the City of Boerne cases and the
substantive rules of constitutional law those cases announced. In each
of those cases, the Court reaffirmed the substantive maxim that
Congress may prohibit state action that is not itself unconstitutional as
a means of preventing or remedying state action that does violate the
Constitution.1 76 Accordingly, a statute that affects both constitutional
and unconstitutional state action may be permissible, so long as the re
sulting constraint on permissible state conduct provides a congruent
and proportional remedy or deterrent to actual violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment.i 77 By its terms, this substantive standard does
not require a threshold amount of unconstitutional state action to be
prohibited by the statute relative to the amount of affected permissi
ble conduct.178 Impliedly, then, a prophylactic statute that was
carefully tailored to provide a congruent and proportional remedy to a
core constitutional violation would be an appropriate exercise of
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, even if that
constitutional violation occurred only sporadically.

174. Professor Fallon has noted the inherent conflict between severability and the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Fallon, supra note 1 0, at 1 355 (noting that overbreadth
doctrine "limit[s] the severability of statutes that, as relatively fully specified. include some
identified quantity or proportion of invalid subrules or applications").
175. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882-85 (1997) (considering whether the
Communications Decency Act was susceptible to severing or narrow construction before
invalidating the Act); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 4 1 3 U.S. 601, 613 ( 1 973) ("Facial overbreadth
has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the chal
lenged statute.").
176. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001 )
("Congress'[s] power 'to enforce' the [Fourteenth) Amendment includes the authority both
to remedy and deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat
broader swath of conduct. including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's
text." (citing Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 ( 1 997)))
.

177. City of Boerne, 52 1 U.S. at 530 ("While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate
remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be
achieved.").
1 78. Id.
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The procedural steps the City of Boerne cases have followed dic
tate a different outcome than these substantive standards would sug
gest. As has been noted, these cases evaluate the congruence and pro
portionality of prophylactic legislation by asking whether "many of the
laws affected by the congressional enactment have a significant
likelihood of being unconstitutional."1 79 As such, the boundary
separating statutory restraints on permissible state conduct that satisfy
the congruence and proportionality standard from those that do not is
defined by reference to the magnitude of the core constitutional viola
tion addressed by the legislation. Although the substantive principles
are ambivalent on this point, the overbreadth approach requires
"many" unconstitutional state actions as a prerequisite to section 5
legislation.180 Moreover, as is inherent in the overbreadth approach,
the magnitude of the constitutional problem is also assessed in relative
terms: section 5 legislation is invalid if the Court identifies an
unfavorable ratio of legitimate to illegitimate applications.181 In other
words, although the substantive principles do not appear to attach any
significance to this ratio, the procedural method of adjudication re
quires assessment of the amount of affected state action that is likely
to be unconstitutional relative to the amount of affected state action
that is not unconstitutional.182 It is the procedural approach, not the
substantive standards, that has determined the outcomes in these
cases.183
This seemingly pedantic inconsistency between substance and pro
cedure has significant ramifications for the respective roles of
Congress and the courts in the interpretation and enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment. By using an overbreadth rule to test a stat
ute's congruence and proportionality, the procedural approach
penalizes statutes that enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against a
problem that the Court finds to be too small to justify any prophylactic

179. Id. at 532; see supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
1 80. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text. That the method of adjudication
drives the outcome in these cases is problematic in part because it incorporates this indeter
minate requirement that "many" affected state actions have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, withcmt offering any guidance as to what
will meet this threshold. United States v. Morrison illustrates the difficulty this produces.
Compare Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000) ("[T)he problem of discrimination against the
victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even most States."), with
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("This Court has not previously held that
Congress must document the existence of a problem in every State prior to proposing a
national solution.").
181. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (explaining that overbreadth
doctrine requires a burden on a "substantial" amount of protected expression "judged i n
relation t o the statute's plainly legitimate sweep").
182. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
1 83. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.
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response.184 As such, it negates the substantive principle that "[i]t is for
Congress in the first instance to 'determine whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' ''.185 Despite this substantive deference to legislative
policy choices, the overbreadth approach requires the Court to make
its own determination as to whether remedial legislation is truly
necessary, or whether a statute is instead "an unwarranted response to
a perhaps inconsequential problem."186
D.

The Federalism Defense of Section Five Overbreadth

When the Supreme Court altered its traditional rules of constitu
tional adjudication in the special context of the First Amendment, it
did so only after concluding that weighty considerations warranted an
exception.187 Although the development of the First Amendment
overbreadth approach clashed with ordinary rules of standing and
principles of judicial review, the Court concluded that "the sensitive
nature of protected expression" necessitated a departure from these
ordinary rules because "persons whose expression is constitutionally
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fe ar of
criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected
expression."188 By contrast, when City of Boerne and subsequent deci
sions examining legislation under Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment adopted a method of adjudication that is
closely akin to the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the Court
neither acknowledged the development nor discussed whether any
considerations justify its use in the Fourteenth Amendment context.189
Were it to address the appropriateness of the section 5 over
breadth approach, the Court likely would consider a defense rooted in
the protection of federalism and states' rights. In several doctrinal
areas, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a renewed sensitivity to
the importance of federalism in the constitutional structure.190 Such
1 84. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001)
("[T)hese incidents taken together fall fa r short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitu
tional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based.").
185. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 651
(1966) ).
1 86. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) .
1 87. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-69 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601 , 61 1-12 ( 1 973); see also supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
1 88. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 61 1 ("It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs
breathing space. . . . ).
"

1 89. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
190. For example, the Court has interpreted the Tenth Amendment to prohibit
Congress from conscripting the regulatory channels of state governments into the enforce-
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sensitivity may warrant the use of exceptional rules of adjudication
when necessary to prevent federal encroachment into prerogatives
traditionally reserved to the states.191 Just as the overbreadth doctrine
developed in the First Amendment context in recognition of the
paramount importance of expressive rights, so might it be applied in
the section 5 context in light of the important constitutional values of
federalism and state sovereignty.
This federalism justification for extending the overbreadth doc
trine for the benefit of states is perplexing, however, in the context of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which effected a significant shift in the
federal-state balance192 and which sanctioned intrusions by Congress
into "spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States."193 As
Justice Breyer has noted, rules for interpreting section 5 "that would
provide States with special protection . . . run counter to the very ob
ject of the Fourteenth Amendment."194 In light of the substantial "fed
eralism costs" contemplated by the Reconstruction Amendments,195 it
makes little sense to adjudicate challenges under those amendments in
a manner that is overly solicitous of states' rights.
Moreover, transporting a rule of adjudication from the First
Amendment context to the federalism context implies a dubious
analogy between the nature of individual rights and states' rights and
the mechanisms by which those rights ought to be preserved.196 There
ment of federal law. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Moreover, the Court has protected the reseryed powers of the
states by closely policing the limits on Congress's delegated powers. See United S!ates v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court has
also protected the dignity and effective function of states by interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment as confirmation of the background principle of sovereign immunity. See Fed.
Mar. Comm. v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 ( 1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). These lines of cases reflect
the perceived value of the states within the Constitution's federal structure. See generally
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 39, 45, 46, 51 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1 961 ); WILLIAM H. RIKER,
FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE (1964); Barry Friedman, Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1 997); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Rethinking Federalism, J. ECON. PERSP. Fall 1 997, at 43; Gary Lawson & Patricia B .
Granger, The 'Proper' Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1 993).
191. Cf. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 V AND. L. REV. 593, 631 (1 992) (describing
the development of the clear statement rule in sovereign immunity cases as a procedural
mechanism adopted for the protection of states).
192. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).
193. Id.
1 94. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 388 (2001) (Breyer, J., dis
senting).
195. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999).
196. Although an extended discussion of the nature of rights is beyond the scope of this
Note, it is worth noting that the overbreadth doctrine is commonly perceived as a resolution
to the conflict between the presumptive bar against facial challenges and the "valid rule
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is no obvious chilling effect on the ability or willingness of state actors
to challenge federal legislation. 197 On the contrary, at least in the case
of federal legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity, no action
adverse to state interests can occur except in the course of litigation,
which necessarily creates an opportunity for the defendant state to
challenge the constitutionality of the abrogation. Nor has the Court
advanced any reason why the state actions at issue in the section 5
cases require any special "breathing space,"198 as the Court found to be
the case with individual First Amendment rights.199 Given this incon
gruity between individual expressive rights and the right of states to be
free from overreaching by the federal government, the federalism
defense for the creation of section 5 overbreadth appears tenuous at
best.

requirement," which holds that every individual has a personal right not to be sanctioned
under an invalid rule of law, even where the law's invalidity arises only with respect to other
individuals. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note JO, at 1331 {discussing the conflict between the
as-applied rule of United States v. Raines and Professor Monaghan's valid rule requirement)
(citing Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1 981 SUP. Cr. REV. 1 , 3); Isserles, supra note
10, at 388-91 (discussing Professor Monaghan's defense of the overbreadth doctrine as a
necessary outgrowth of the valid rule requirement). But see Matthew D. Adler, Rights
Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. l
{ 1998) (same); Adler, supra note 1 0, at 1 395-406 (questioning the correctness of the valid
rule principle). Whatever similarity may exist between states' "rights" and individual
"rights," it is not at all obvious that states should be equally entitled to the benefit of the
valid rule principle. A closely related debate concerns the question of whether courts should
enforce structural principles such as federalism using the same mechanisms it uses to protect
individual rights, or whether those principles should be left to the protection of the political
process. See generally JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1980); Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's " Unsteady
Path ": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 {1995);
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 543 (1954); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1311 (1 997). One need not favor total judicial abdication of any role in the protection of
states' rights to allow for the possibility that the nature of those rights may be sufficiently
diffe rent from the individual rights enshrined in the First Amendment such that the use of
precisely the same methods of protection may not be appropriate.
197. See supra notes 143- 1 45 and accompanying text.
198. Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 4 1 3 U.S. 601 , 61 1 (1973).
199. Indeed, for the Court to conclude that these state actions required special
"breathing space" would directly contradict Congress's policy judgment that the state
actions in question infringed on individual civil rights, arguably in violation of the Four
teenth Amendment.
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III. THE FUTURE OF SECTION FIVE: FACIAL INVALIDATION OF
TITLE VII?
A hypothetical case involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act200
demonstrates that the Court's new section 5 overbreadth approach
leads to different - and troubling - substantive outcomes. Under
Title VII, individuals may sue their state employers for discriminating
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.201 Consider
the case of an Asian-American woman who is terminated from her
position as a professor at a state university.202 Suppose she sues her
former employer, alleging that the state violated Title VII by
discharging her because of her race and gender. In defense, the state
argues that sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's claim. As Congress
may only abrogate a state's sovereign immunity pursuant to section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the court must consider the validity of
Title VII as an exercise of Congress's power under section 5 to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause.203
Under the traditional approach to constitutional adjudication, the
court would analyze this issue only by reference to the facts and scope
of the immediate case.204 Following United States v. Raines,205 if the
application of Title VII in the plaintiff's case was clearly constitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment, that "should [be] an end to the
question of constitutionality."206 Accordingly, the validity of Title VII
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); see supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. As has been noted, the Supreme Court held in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer that the 1 972 amendments to Title VII constituted an abrogation of state immunity
from suit under Title VII. 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra note 23.
202. This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Nanda v. Board of Trustees ofthe
University of Illinois, 219 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The validity of Title VII as an ex
ercise of Congress's section 5 power has also been considered in several other lower federal
court decisions. See supra note 23.
203. The Fitzpatrick Court held that Title VII effectively abrogated state sovereign im
munity, but because the parties to that case did not dispute its constitutionality, the Court
did not squarely decide the validity of the abrogation under section 5. See 427 U.S. at 456
n.1 1 . Lower courts that have relied on Fitzpatrick in Title VII suits have acknowledged that
Fitzpatrick may not be controlling in light of subsequent cases. See, e.g., Okruhlik v. Univ. of
Ark., 255 F. 3d 615, 622 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against
Ala., 198 F.3d 1 305, 1 3 17 (11 th Cir. 1999); Nanda, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14; Okokuro v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Welfa re, No. 00-2044, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15699, at *10 n.4 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 31, 2000). These courts' reliance on Fitzpatrick stems from the rule that it is the re
sponsibility of the Supreme Court, not the lower courts, to clarify the law in this area. See
Okruhlik, 255 F.3d at 622 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U .S. 203, 237 (1997)); In re
Employment Litig., 198 F.3d at 1317 (same); Nanda, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 913-14 (same); Oko
kuro, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15699, at *10 n.4 (same). In this hypothetical, therefore, the
Supreme Court would be free to consider anew whether Title VII is valid under section 5.
204. See supra Section I.B.
205. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
206. Raines, 362 U.S. at 24-25. As noted above, Raines governed section 5 cases prior to
City of Boerne. See supra Section J.B.
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- and of the plaintiff's suit - would depend only on whether it is ap
propriate under section 5 for Congress to expose states to suit for
damages when they intentionally discriminate on the basis of race or
gender. As the Fourteenth Amendment itself prohibits such discrimi
nation, the remedy provided in Title VII is perfectly congruent to the
constitutional violation to be prevented.207 Under the traditional ap
proach, the court would not consider Title VII on its face unless the
state defe ndant could demonstrate that "no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."208 Having found that application
of Title VII to intentional discrimination that violates the Equal
Protection Clause is appropriate under section 5, the court would not
entertain the state's facial challenge.209 Under this traditional ap
proach, then, the abrogation of state immunity in Title VII would be
valid under section 5, and the plaintiff's suit could proceed.
The Supreme Court's new section 5 overbreadth approach leads to
a dramatically different result. Following the City of Boerne cases, a
court would measure Title VII as a whole against the relevant equal
protection standard.210 If the statute deviated from that standard to
such an extent that it would prohibit constitutional state action in
hypothetical circumstances, the Act would be invalid unless the court
determined that the Act affects "many" state actions that have a sig
nificant likelihood of being unconstitutional, judged in relation to its
illegitimate sweep.211
Among the potential applications that would fall within the court's
scrutiny under this approach would be Title VII's prohibition of
207. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1 976) ("The central purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official
conduct discriminating on the basis of race."). I ntentional discrimination on the basis of race,
though not per se a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is only permissible in the rare
circumstance that it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.
Adarand v. Pena, 5 1 5 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Similarly, intentional discrimination on the basis
of gender is impermissible unless a state demonstrates that it is substantially related to the
achievement of important governmental objectives. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 5 15,
532-33 ( 1 996). For this reason, courts and commentators have often described the require
ments of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause as coextensive with respect to inten
tional discrimination. See, e.g., Okruhlik, 255 F.3d at 626 ("(Tjhe elements of a claim of in
tentional discrimination are essentially the same under Title VII and the Constitution.");
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1 19 1 , 1 1 96 ( 1 996) (describing
equal protection and Title VII claims as "perfectly parallel"), disapproved on other grounds
by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 ( 1 998); Cross v. Alabama Dep't of
Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1 490, 1508 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 995) (describing Title
VII and the Equal Protection Clause as "parallel remed(ies]"); Juliano, supra note 25, at
1 1 1 2.
208. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
209. Even if the Court considered other applications of the Act, these would bear on the
plaintiff's case only in the event that these applications were found to be inseverable from
the rest of the Act. See supra Section H.B.
210. See supra Section I.A.
211. See supra Section I.A.
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neutral employment practices that produce a disparate impact on the
basis of race or gender.212 The Fourteenth Amendment itself does not
prohibit facially neutral state action that produces a disparate impact
in the absence of a discriminatory purpose.213 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has cautioned that "[a]lthough disparate impact may be relevant
evidence of racial discrimination, such evidence alone is insufficient
even where the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict
scrutiny."214 By deviating from these constitutional standards, the dis
parate impact provisions of Title VII prohibit a great deal of state ac
tion that is not itself unconstitutional. As a result, the abrogation of
immunity in the plaintiff's case would be invalid unless the court was
satisfied that this broad sweep was justified by the existence of a suffi
cient number of applications to state action that in fact violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the court concluded that this threshold
had not been met, Title VII as a whole - including the abrogation of
state immunity for intentional discrimination - would not be a
valid exercise of Congress's power under section 5. Even though the
plaintiff alleged only intentional discrimination, the state university's
sovereign immunity would preclude the plaintiff from pursuing any
remedy.
As this hypothetical demonstrates, application of the section 5
overbreadth approach may yield a completely different result in a
given case than the traditional approach to constitutional adjudication.
The Supreme Court's recent willingness to invalidate statutes on the
basis of problematic hypothetical applications threatens even those
applications of federal statutes that do not raise any constitutional dif
ficulties in and of themselves. In addition to Title VII, this approach
may endanger other federal civil rights statutes, particularly section 2
of the Voting Rights Act.215 In this manner, the Court's choice of pro212. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); see also supra note 27.
213. See Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 279 (1 979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
214. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2001 ) (internal ci
tation omitted).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2002). After the Supreme Court ruled in Mobile v. Bolden that a
state's discriminatory purpose was a necessary element of a claim of vote dilution under both
the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), Congress amended the
Voting Rights Act to provide that a plaintiff could raise a claim of vote dilution under sec
tion 2 without showing discriminatory purpose. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1 982,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982). See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL.,
THE LAW OF D EMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 7 10-45 (2d ed.
2001 ). Although the Supreme Court issued a summary affirmance of the amended section 2
in 1984, see Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984), cur
rent members of the Court have more recently indicated their belief that the constitutional
ity of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act remains an open question. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera,
517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1028-29 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the wake of City of Boerne, several commenta-
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cedural approach may exert a dispositive effect on substantive
outcomes.
CONCLUSION
This Note argues that the Supreme Court has developed a new ap
proach to adjudicating challenges to federal legislation under section
5. This approach imports the concept of overbreadth from First
Amendment doctrine into the Fourteenth Amendment context by
measuring the text and legislative findings of federal statutes directly
against the relevant constitutional standard, without regard to the spe
cific facts of the case before the Court. Under this approach, the Court
has replaced the standard of United States v. Salerno with the standard
of Broadrick v. Oklahoma, invalidating federal legislation on the basis
of an unfavorable ratio of the number of valid applications - in which
"many" affected state actions have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional - to the number of invalid applications, just as the
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine turns on the ratio of a stat
ute's "legitimate sweep" to the magnitude of the burden it imposes on
protected expression.
As this Note has demonstrated, the development of the Court's
new overbreadth approach to challenges under section 5 raises a
number of concerns. It conflicts with settled principles of severability
and judicial review while creating an internal inconsistency within the
substantive law governing section 5. Although a federalism-based
argument may offer some justification for this approach, these difficul
ties appear, at first blush, to outweigh the federalism considerations.
At the same time, the adoption of this overbreadth approach
has largely determined the substantive outcomes in the City of
Boerne cases and promises to do so in future cases. As such, the Court
would do well to address this issue more explicitly and to reflect
more carefully upon the wisdom of this method of constitutional
adjudication.

tors have argued that section 2 is unconstitutional insofa r as it prohibits state electoral sys
tems that result in vote dilution even in the absence of discriminatory purpose. See Heather
K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undilllted Vote, 1 1 4 HARV. L. REV. 1 663, 1 737
(2001 ); Douglas Laycock, Concepwal Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 743, 749-52 ( 1 998). But see Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section
Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 728-29 (1998).
See generally lSSACHAROFF ET AL., supra at 859-66. As with Title VII, the Court's new sec
tion 5 overbreadth approach threatens the viability of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act be
cause the existence of these problematic applications may result in facial invalidation even in
a case alleging only intentional vote dilution.

